Preface

Many Americans place their hope in the 2026 elections, trusting that ordinary institutional checks will halt the present slide toward authoritarianism. Large-scale ballot manipulation remains difficult in the United States, and even a determined administration cannot simply manufacture the additional tens of millions of votes needed for a clear majority. Yet this optimism rests on a further assumption-that a critical share of Trump voters will recognize the erosion of democratic norms and withdraw their support once the danger becomes undeniable. The evidence reviewed here counsels caution. As long as status anxiety, cultural backlash, and the emotional reward of punitive politics continue to outweigh material self-interest, a sizable bloc of the electorate may prefer the reassurance of dominance to the restoration of constitutional balance.

The below three works supplied the conceptual spine for this study. Kuziemko and Norton’s exploration of last-place aversion exposed how fear of downward rank can override prospects of absolute gain, furnishing a micro-level explanation for resistance to policies that aid those just below (Kuziemko and Norton, Last-place Aversion, 2010)

The Public Religion Research Institute’s 2024 American Values Survey translated that mechanism into contemporary opinion data, demonstrating that cultural-threat indicators- immigration anxiety, discomfort with changing gender roles, Christian-nationalist sentiment- predict Trump allegiance far better than income metrics (Public Religion Research Institute, American Values Survey, 2024)

Smith and colleagues’ work on partisan schadenfreude then clarified why cruelty itself becomes politically valuable, linking authoritarian aggression to the emotional gratification of seeing out-groups harmed (Smith, Schadenfreude in Partisan Politics, 2023)

Together these studies shifted my focus from material deprivation to relative status anxiety, from transactional policy outcomes to symbolic violence, and from economic calculations to the emotional economics of dominance. The analysis that follows weaves their insights into a coherent account of MAGA support; readers may consult the attached PDFs for full empirical details.

Abstract

Support for MAGA and Donald Trump’s movement is better explained by perceived cultural and symbolic threats than by objective economic hardship. Drawing on theory and data, this article argues that MAGA partisans are driven by fears of status loss – especially among white men – that stem from rising power of women, immigrants, and racial minorities. Concepts such as last-place aversion, precarious masculinity, racialized resentment, authoritarian aggression, and partisan schadenfreude help explain why many Trump supporters favor cruelty and punitive policies. Lab and survey evidence show, for example, that individuals just above the bottom of the social hierarchy resist policies helping those just below them; that men who fear losing traditional masculine status support aggressive “tough-on-crime” candidates; and that ideologically extreme partisans take pleasure in out-party suffering and will vote for candidates promising to “disproportionately harm” rivals. Such findings indicate MAGA allegiance rests on preserving in-group dominance through symbolic violence (e.g., harsh immigration or criminal-justice policies), rather than on alleviating poverty. These dynamics closely parallel historical authoritarian movements (e.g. Nazi Germany), which similarly employed scapegoating of minorities and celebrated cruelty as a way to reassure threatened majorities. We integrate these literatures and 2024 survey data to show how racialized resentment, male status anxiety, and authoritarian dispositions combine to fuel Trump’s base, while economic anxieties play a limited role.

Introduction

The fervent loyalty of the “MAGA” (Make America Great Again) movement and Donald Trump’s base poses a paradox for analysts. Though Trump’s rhetoric is openly racist, nativist, and hostile to democratic norms, his core supporters remain fiercely devoted. Early explanations often emphasized economic deprivation – the decline of manufacturing jobs, globalization, or inequality – as a root cause. However, recent research and polling suggest these voters are motivated mainly by cultural and symbolic threats. In this view, Trump’s followers – disproportionately white, male, and Christian – feel their group’s status under siege. They perceive that gains by women, immigrants, and people of color (who together have been the primary beneficiaries of social change since the 1960s) threaten their traditional dominance. Symbols of this change (e.g. a female vice president, growing racial diversity) are seen as assaults on the group’s rightful place.

We argue that MAGA support is fundamentally an authoritarian-populist backlash to perceived status loss. Psychological theories such as last-place aversion and precarious manhood explain why even economically secure individuals might turn against redistributive policies if doing so would elevate others above them. Similarly, measures of racial resentment and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) predict Trump support, reflecting a desire to dominate out-groups rather than address material needs. Political schadenfreude – taking pleasure in opponents’ misfortune – further channels this resentment into support for cruel policies. In sum, MAGA adherents are motivated by group-based fears: the horror of falling into “last place,” anxiety about losing traditional masculine status, and hostility toward outgroups blamed for change.

We develop these ideas in five sections. First, we review key theoretical concepts from the literature (last-place aversion, masculine status anxiety, racialized resentment, authoritarian personality, and political schadenfreude). Second, we apply these concepts to MAGA by examining recent survey data and studies: for example, PRRI polling showing immigration and identity issues top the agenda of Republican voters. Third, we explore how cruelty and punitive policy preferences function as emotional reassurance for threatened status – drawing on evidence that MAGA supporters explicitly enjoy “owning” or harming partisan out-groups. Fourth, we draw parallels with historical authoritarian movements (noting, e.g., Nazi Germany’s scapegoating of minorities as a bulwark against perceived decline). Finally, we conclude that treating MAGA support as primarily economic misses the larger picture: it is a culturally rooted authoritarian populism, reliant on racialized resentment, gender hierarchy, and symbolic violence.

Theoretical Background

Last-Place Aversion and Relative Status

Traditional theories of economic populism suggest that material deprivation breeds discontent. Yet experimental and survey data indicate a subtler phenomenon: many individuals exhibit last-place aversion, a motive to avoid falling below others in one’s reference group. Kuziemko et al. (2013) demonstrated that in experimental games, people close to the bottom of a distribution will refuse gains if they risk letting someone else move ahead of them. Translated to politics, this means that voters who are low-income but not the very poorest may oppose welfare or minimum-wage increases if those policies would lift others above them. Using survey data, Kuziemko and colleagues found that Americans earning just above the poverty line were less supportive of redistribution than both the very poor and more affluent citizens. This “leapfrogging fear” helps explain why many working- and lower-middle-class white Americans do not favor policies that could empower racial and ethnic minorities. In other words, voters secure in relative status may view redistribution as a threat: helping others rise feels like a personal loss of status.

Last-place aversion thus shifts the narrative from absolute hardship to relative status. Crucially, it predicts opposition to policies aiding those who look like one’s own neighbors (e.g. immigrants or minorities in one’s community) – since it is those “neighbors” who stand to gain. The theory aligns with data showing white Americans who feel themselves “better off” still resist policies like the minimum wage or Medicaid expansion, especially if they believe the likely beneficiaries are racial minorities or immigrants. Kuziemko et al. (2013) note that this relative-motivated opposition often masquerades in more acceptable rhetoric, but can in part reflect the fear of being overtaken by those on the very bottom. In sum, last-place aversion suggests that MAGA supporters may prioritize cultural dominance and relative advantage over absolute economic relief: preserving group hierarchy is more urgent than reducing personal hardship.

Masculine Status Anxiety (Precarious Manhood)

A related theme is status anxiety, especially among men. Historically, many cultures define manhood in terms of dominance, competitiveness, and self-reliance. When economic and social changes undermine traditional male roles, a sense of precarious status can emerge. The precarious manhood theory (DiMuccio & Knowles, 2021) formalizes this: it posits that men who fear they fall short of masculine ideals will seek to reaffirm their manhood by embracing “political aggression.” In one survey study, DiMuccio and Knowles measured men’s worries about meeting masculine expectations and found that higher anxiety predicted greater support for aggressive policies (e.g. the death penalty, military expansion). Crucially, this relationship held even after controlling for conservatism and other traits, indicating a distinct effect of status insecurity.

The theory also predicts macro-level patterns: DiMuccio and Knowles found that regions with more evidence of masculine anxiety (measured via Google search frequencies for male-related self-doubt) tended to vote more heavily for Trump in 2016, whereas no such pattern emerged for earlier Republican candidates. This suggests that the Trump brand – with its outspoken, hyper-masculine persona – uniquely attracted men eager to display toughness. Trump’s public image (“dominant, unyielding, and virile”) feeds into this dynamic, offering threatened men a way to feel powerful vicariously. In consequence, male status anxiety translates into support for a candidate who promises to punish and punish decisively (for example, advocating torture or harsh policing), because these signals of dominance reassure insecure voters. This mechanism helps explain why MAGA rhetoric so often emphasizes “toughness” and why policies on crime or national defense loom large in Trumpism.

In sum, precarious manhood theory predicts that male supporters of an authoritarian leader will disproportionately endorse cruel or punitive policies. These men see such policies as confirmation of their own masculine worth. As DiMuccio and Knowles conclude, “men who are likely to doubt their masculinity may support aggressive policies, politicians, and parties, possibly as a means of affirming their manhood”. Importantly, this process is largely cultural or psychological: it occurs irrespective of actual economic gain.

Racial Resentment and Cultural Backlash

A vast literature in political psychology has identified racial resentment as a strong driver of right-wing voting, especially in the Trump era. Racial resentment scales (originally developed by Kinder & Sears) measure attitudes like the belief that Black Americans are getting unfair advantages or that women already have equal opportunities. Numerous studies find that white resentment of minority advancement strongly predicts support for Trump and his policies (often even more so than measures of financial insecurity) (e.g., MacWilliams, 2016; Sides et al., 2023). These resentments are often expressed in coded cultural terms – claims of “reverse discrimination,” “political correctness,” or the defense of “traditional values.”

Norris and Inglehart (2019) articulate this as a cultural backlash: as societies liberalize on gender, sexuality, race, and religion, traditionalist segments perceive an existential threat. They react by endorsing populist-authoritarian leaders who promise to roll back social progress and reassert the old order. Trump’s slogan “Make America Great Again” explicitly evokes a return to a mythical past when (implicitly) white men held unchallenged dominance. In practice, MAGA rhetoric channels racialized resentment: illegal immigration is condemned as destroying American (white) culture, affirmative action is branded as unjust, and multiculturalism is portrayed as diluting national identity.

Survey data confirm that cultural issues greatly outweigh economic ones for Trump supporters. For instance, a 2024 PRRI poll shows that 75% of voters who rate immigration as a top issue prefer Trump. By contrast, among those who prioritize jobs or inflation, Trump holds only a narrow edge. Similarly, 71% of Republicans rate immigration as a “critical issue,” compared to far lower percentages on racial inequality or economic distress. These patterns indicate that MAGA supporters are galvanized by the perception that outsiders (immigrants, refugees, or even “liberals”) are infringing on the nation’s cultural space. Protecting the status of their group – defined by race, religion, and gender – is prioritized above collective material improvement.

Smith (2019) concisely captures this in his study of Trump’s 2016 base: he notes that what typified Trump’s partisans was “the vehemence of their prejudices,” and a desire for a leader who would “crush evil” and “get rid of rotten apples” – phrases clearly aimed at feminists, liberals, immigrants, and minorities. In other words, MAGA politics is saturated with racialized resentment and symbolic violence: policies targeting out-groups serve not just a functional purpose but a ritual one, signaling group supremacy. The belief that one’s own group (often white Christians) is being “replaced” or losing privilege creates a potent grievance that Trump leverages. This is consistent with cultural backlash theory and numerous empirical studies showing racial attitudes trump economics in predicting MAGA loyalty.

Authoritarian Personality and Group Dominance

The classic theory of the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1950) posited that certain individuals – predisposed to strict conformity and hostility toward out-groups – are drawn to authoritarian leaders. Modern work operationalizes this via scales like Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA, emphasizing submission, authority, and aggression) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO, emphasizing group-based dominance). Recent analyses of Trump voters consistently find elevated RWA/SDO scores. For example, Womick et al. (2019) used four separate samples to show that facets of both RWA and SDO predicted Trump support even after controlling for demographics. Crucially, compared to other Republican voters, Trump supporters were uniquely high in the authoritarian aggression and group dominance subscales – meaning they explicitly wished to dominate and punish out-groups.

In their words, “Trump voters were consistently higher in group-based dominance and authoritarian aggression… driven by the desire to dominate out-group members in an aggressive manner”. This finding reinforces the earlier points: MAGA supporters are not primarily submissive to leaders or tradition (another RWA facet), but relish asserting power over others. Their political agenda thus tends to include policies that preserve or restore in-group hierarchy – for instance, harsher immigration laws, expanded policing powers, or rollback of civil rights protections – as well as vilifying any perceived enemies of the group. Again, this is about symbolic standing rather than personal gain: a White House devoted to “law and order” sends a message that the dominant group will not tolerate challenge or competition.

Authoritarian personality theory also predicts a willingness to sacrifice democratic norms for in-group security. Indeed, surveys have shown that Trump supporters are more likely than others to agree with statements like “true patriots may have to resort to violence to save the country,” indicating comfort with extralegal action against opponents. (Note: these data are from other surveys.) The combination of authoritarian aggression and dominance orientation creates a psychological foundation for cruelty – the enjoyment of harming out-groups – as we discuss next.

Political Schadenfreude and Candidate Cruelty

A recent line of research highlights schadenfreude – the pleasure taken in others’ misfortune – as a growing feature of partisanship. Webster, Glynn, and Motta (2023) define partisan schadenfreude as “joy in the suffering” of political opponents. Analyzing national survey items, they find that a substantial fraction of Americans endorse items like “It makes me happy when [out-party] leaders suffer defeats.” Importantly, schadenfreude is most prevalent among ideologically extreme voters. Their experiments further show that individuals high in schadenfreude are more likely to vote for candidates who promise policies that “disproportionately harm” the other party’s supporters. In other words, desire for cruelty becomes part of the platform.

This has direct relevance to MAGA: Trump himself often rewards supporters who mock or punish “liberals,” and many MAGA figures explicitly frame politics as a zero-sum fight. Webster et al. find that up to half of Americans say they would likely vote for a candidate promising to target the out-group, and that this voting preference is stronger among those high in schadenfreude. We can see this in comments like “owning the libs” or social media posts gleefully celebrating any bad news for Democrats. The authors conclude that partisan schadenfreude is “widespread and has disturbing implications,” since it emboldens support for cruel, punitive agendas.

For MAGA supporters, schadenfreude dovetails with other drivers: racialized resentment and masculine status threats make an easy target. Enjoying an out-group’s suffering is one way to symbolically reverse the shame of status loss. Indeed, the combination of fear (of being outcompeted) and schadenfreude produces a psychological motive to inflict cruelty: if those “others” must be punished for encroaching, the punisher feels vindicated and safer in status. Thus we see a feedback loop: MAGA rhetoric amplifies fears of threat, which increases schadenfreude; in turn, schadenfreude drives demand for more extreme policies, which further marginalize those groups.

MAGA Support: Cultural Threats Over Economic Hardship

Empirical evidence supports the view that MAGA allegiance is largely about culture, not pocketbooks. Consider recent polling from the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI). In 2024, PRRI asked Americans what issues are “critical” to their vote. Overall, economic concerns (housing costs, jobs) and democracy-related issues rank high for the population. But party breakdowns are striking: 71% of Republicans rate immigration as a critical issue (versus only 27% of Democrats), and 57% of Republicans rate crime as critical (versus 43% of Democrats). By contrast, only about one-third of all Americans rated racial inequality (25%) or jobs/unemployment (34%) as critical.

Moreover, when voters prioritized immigration, 75% said they would back Trump over Biden, whereas on issues like jobs or inflation, voters were roughly split. In other words, immigration – a symbolic-cultural issue – was far more predictive of MAGA support than economic distress. Similarly, PRRI finds that a clear majority of Republicans (68%) believe that American culture and way of life has changed for the worse since the 1950s (compared to only 31% of Democrats). This reflects a narrative of decline and threat: Trump’s supporters largely see social change as damaging rather than progress.

This PRRI evidence dovetails with academic findings. As Smith (2019) notes, economic worries were prevalent across all voters in 2016 and did not distinguish Trump’s supporters. Instead, what did differentiate them was “the vehemence of their prejudices” and the desire for a leader who would firmly reassert group dominance. For example, Smith highlights that Trump voters vividly supported rhetoric about “crushing” enemies of their group (however defined). In short, MAGA voters demand symbolic victories and status protection – policies that punish or exclude those seen as encroaching – much more than they demand better housing or higher wages.

Our theoretical review predicts this pattern: last-place aversion and status anxiety lead people to resist policies that benefit out-groups, while authoritarian aggression and schadenfreude incline them to enjoy such resistance and even to demand active punishment of out-groups. We can thus interpret MAGA support as a cultural-psychological phenomenon: it is an effort by a historically dominant group to preserve its standing through in-group solidarity and out-group scapegoating.

Emotional Reassurance Through Cruelty and Punitive Policies

A key component of this dynamic is the emotional reassurance that cruelty provides. For voters who feel their social status slipping, endorsing harsh policies and leaders who promise to enforce them can be comforting. This may seem paradoxical: why would people take comfort in violence? But psychologically, punishing a threatening out-group reaffirms an in-group’s strength and bolsters self-worth. Research on authoritarianism suggests that violence and cruelty can be deeply cathartic for resentful groups, providing “affective rewards” of superiority.

We have already noted that Trump’s base explicitly responds to violent, punitive rhetoric. In 2016, his campaign clamored about executing terrorists (and even American citizens accused of terrorism), against the advice of many experts. Smith (2019) observes that voters who wanted Trump did so not despite his promise of “crush(ing) evil” but precisely because of it. In psychology, this aligns with the idea that the expression of cruelty indicates genuine animus toward the target; supporters saw cruelty as a feature, not a bug.

Webster et al. (2023) experimentally confirm that voters high in schadenfreude prefer candidates who promise cruelty. For example, in a survey experiment, participants rated hypothetical candidates, some of whom pledged to impose policies that would “crush” or “crush the opposition,” while others spoke of justice or fairness. High-schadenfreude respondents rewarded the cruel candidates, whereas low-schadenfreude respondents preferred less-violent options. This demonstrates that for a subset of voters, cruelty is itself a valued policy outcome.

What kind of policies does this manifest in MAGA platforms? Immigration bans and family separations, aggressive policing and sentencing, “Muslim bans,” ending diversity programs, and harsh rhetoric toward protesters are all examples. Many Trump allies celebrated the January 6 rioters as patriots (nearly 30% of Republicans agreed violence might be needed). These are not procedural disputes over resources; they are deliberately punitive measures aimed at specific groups or dissidents. Such policies function as symbolic violence – they send a message to the in-group (“we will not be pushed around”) even if they hurt social cohesion.

In summary, cruelty provides MAGA supporters with emotional relief. By scapegoating and harming targeted minorities or political enemies, they symbolically reverse the anxiety of loss. This can create a positive feedback: the more threatened they feel, the more cruelty they endorse to feel potent again. As Smith (2019) warns, ignoring this emotional core is perilous: “social scientists … blame stress and anxiety” for harsh rhetoric, rather than conceding it is rooted in active prejudice and desire for dominance.

Parallels to Historical Authoritarian Movements

The combination of group-based anxiety, scapegoating, and cruelty in MAGA politics has clear historical analogues. The classic case is Nazi Germany, where Hitler capitalized on Germans’ sense of humiliation after World War I. The Nazis blamed Jews, Communists, and other minorities for Germany’s woes, portraying them as existential threats to the “Volk.” This scapegoating was accompanied by a cult of violent dominance: SS units, concentration camps, and death squads were lauded as necessary to cleanse the nation. Many scholars note that fascism relies on palingenetic nationalism – the myth of national rebirth through heroic violence against impure enemies (Griffin, 1991).

While it is not helpful to equate all aspects of Trumpism with 1930s fascism, there are illuminating parallels. MAGA rhetoric elevates the in-group (often implicitly “white Christians”) to an embattled status, and demonizes out-groups as disloyal or dangerous. For example, slogans like “kill the deep state” or “send them home” echo the scapegoating language of dictatorships. The punishment of out-groups (e.g. aggressive deportations, conspiracy to overturn elections targeting “illegitimate” authorities) is framed as vindication of the people. Gerald Lucas (2023) observes that MAGA “mirrors the characteristics of historical fascism,” including scapegoating of marginalized groups such as immigrants and racial minorities. Authoritarian movements often proclaim themselves as protecting their people by any means; Trump’s encouragement of violence against protesters, or talk of executing opponents, resonates with this pattern.

Another similarity is the role of in-group solidarity through cruelty. Under Nazism, Germans were encouraged to view brutality against “others” as not only necessary but ennobling. In MAGA circles, social media posts mocking liberal cries for justice or celebrating the misfortunes of Democrats (“think of their tears”) serve the same function. Webster et al.’s finding of widespread partisan schadenfreude is thus not new in history, but a contemporary manifestation of the same human tendency: schadenfreude can be weaponized politically.

Finally, both contexts share the conviction that moral high ground is on their side. Trump supporters frequently cast themselves as real patriots, defending “true America,” while labeling opponents as wicked or traitorous. This moral dichotomy justifies cruelty as righteous. For instance, in Nazi propaganda Jews were portrayed as subhuman pests; in MAGA rhetoric, immigrants are often painted as criminals. The symbolic violence – arguing that the out-group deserves to be harmed for society’s sake – is central to both.

Of course, America in 2025 is not a one-party state, and Nazi-level atrocities have not occurred. But these parallels underscore a danger: when political competition becomes about “owning” the other and exacting revenge rather than policy debate, authoritarianism looms large. Identifying these dynamics in MAGA support helps us understand how a once-democratic party faction can become authoritarian-leaning.

Conclusion

The evidence from theory, surveys, and history all point to the same conclusion: support for Trump’s MAGA movement is rooted primarily in cultural status anxieties, not in simple economic self-interest. Factors like last-place aversion, male status threats, and racial resentment create a wellspring of fear and anger. Authoritarian personality traits – especially a hunger to dominate and aggress against others – then translate those feelings into political allegiance. Partisan schadenfreude completes the picture by showing how many supporters even enjoy seeing punitive policies enacted on opponents.

In practice, this means that MAGA policies serve a symbolic emotional function. Voters who feel humiliated or insecure by social change take solace in watching out-groups suffer. Every cruelty (from harsh immigration edicts to reward for vigilante violence) is not just a political act, but an emotional promise: “we are still strong.” Sadly, this dynamic mirrors earlier authoritarian movements that also preserved majority status through scapegoating and violence.

Recognizing these drivers is crucial for analysts and policymakers. If MAGA loyalty is indeed born of cultural threat perceptions, then addressing only material concerns will not sway these voters. Instead, responses would require validating their sense of respect and identity in non-destructive ways, and countering the allure of cruelty with narratives of solidarity. Our analysis suggests that without confronting the underlying prejudices and status anxieties fueling MAGA, American democracy may continue to face destabilizing pressures from within.

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References

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Kuziemko, I., Buell, R., Reich, T., & Norton, M. I. (2013). “Last-place aversion”: Evidence and redistributive implications. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(1), 105–149. doi:10.1093/qje/qjt035.

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