I have set my RAG to update automatically with the actual results of the Trump tariffs- not future potential, not theoretical risks, but the real, measurable impact they are having on the economy. It refreshes daily. Recently, I’ve noticed the numbers beginning to shift significantly. The situation is starting to kick in.
As of 2025, China has significantly reduced its reliance on the U.S. as an export market. According to FastBull, in April 2025 alone, Chinese exports to the United States dropped 21% year-over-year, while exports to ASEAN countries surged by over 20% (https://www.fastbull.com/news-detail/chinas-export-boom-driven-by-asean-trade-surge-4328138_0). This shift reflects a systematic effort to build resilient supply chains outside the orbit of U.S. economic policy.
The Reuters report dated May 21, 2025, confirms that China and ASEAN have finalized negotiations for the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area 3.0, aimed at deepening integration in digital infrastructure and clean tech industries (https://www.reuters.com/markets/emerging/china-asean-complete-negotiations-free-trade-area-30-2025-05-21). These moves solidify a strategic realignment that has been accelerating since the trade war’s early salvos.
Bilateral trade between China and ASEAN reached $234 billion in Q1 of 2025, outpacing U.S.-China trade volume and confirming the diminishing role of the U.S. market in China's export calculus (https://jakartaglobe.id/business/it-can-be-hard-for-asean-to-set-common-negotiation-plan-on-us-tariffs).
As a direct consequence, many U.S.-based producers are facing increased pressure from competitors operating in untariffed zones. Meanwhile, sectors such as U.S. agriculture and manufacturing remain reliant on government subsidies to absorb the blow of lost markets and elevated input costs.
In agriculture, U.S. farmers remain one of the hardest-hit groups. Retaliatory tariffs from China severely reduced American exports of soybeans, pork, and corn. Even after partial tariff rollbacks in 2024, Chinese importers had shifted long-term contracts to Brazil and Argentina. The Guardian recently reported that many farmers are still selling at below production cost and remain anxious over lasting market erosion. See: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/may/21/farmers-fear-trump-trade-winds-could-damage-crops-its-unnerving
Small- and mid-sized farms are especially vulnerable. The Washington Post documented the case of a third-generation Kansas farmer whose revenue fell 28 percent from pre-trade war levels, forcing downsizing and reliance on short-term subsidies. See: https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/interactive/2025/small-farms-trump-government-cuts/
In manufacturing, the cost shocks of the tariff regime have not dissipated. According to PYMNTS, nearly 90 percent of goods-producing firms surveyed in Q2 2025 report persistent price increases and delivery delays due to disrupted supply chains and the relocation of offshore suppliers. See: https://www.pymnts.com/study_posts/tariffs-and-business-uncertainty-the-current-state-of-play-may-2025/
The local economies dependent on industrial production are also under pressure. Barron’s examined conditions in Columbus, Indiana, where manufacturers like Cummins have halted capital expansion and laid off staff in response to surging input costs and declining export orders. See: https://www.barrons.com/articles/trade-war-tariffs-manufacturing-columbus-indiana-f39f7ec7
These developments confirm that what began as a tactical maneuver has reshaped the structural logic of the global economy. Trump’s tariffs did not resurrect domestic industry. They triggered fragmentation, substitution, and subsidy dependence. The numbers now confirm it.
Trump’s trade war did not undo globalization, it simply turned the parade in the opposite direction. Once leading the procession, the United States now finds itself tripping over its own oversized shoes while others march ahead. America tried to redraw the map of commerce with brute theatrics, but the rest of the world adjusted, crowned new clowns, and kept moving. What was meant to restore dominance only spotlighted the absurdity of chasing multipolar power with a scepter of tariffs and face paint of nostalgia.
P.S.Here is what the RAG gives as the 68% probability consequences:
If the current trajectory continues over the next one, three, and five years, with China deepening trade integration across ASEAN, the Global South, and non-U.S.-centric supply corridors, the United States will find itself increasingly isolated within the structures it once dominated.
In 1 year (2026), the effects will sharpen.Subsidy dependence among American farmers and mid-tier manufacturers will grow unsustainable. Budget hawks will clash with agricultural lobbies in Congress. Domestic unrest in rural economies will mount, with bankruptcy and land consolidation intensifying. Global companies will accelerate reconfiguration of their sourcing away from U.S.-based suppliers, particularly in sectors like auto parts, semiconductors, and medical devices. Exporters once buffered by the residual strength of the dollar will see demand collapse in non-aligned markets where new trade blocs reward intra-bloc deals and punish ties to Washington.
In 3 years (2028), the long-term structural damage will become embedded.U.S. agriculture will increasingly resemble a publicly subsidized export ghost town, stripped of competitive pricing and replaced in global markets by Brazil, Vietnam, and Indonesia. American industrial capacity, already thinned by outsourcing, will face a terminal choice: either shift operations to foreign subsidiaries inside untariffed zones or watch clients disappear. The dollar’s hegemony will hold but start to wobble as emerging markets transact in yuan, dirhams, and regional digital currencies. The Fed will face the impossible contradiction of supporting dollar supremacy in a world that increasingly trades without it.
In 5 years (2030), absent a strategic reversal or major geopolitical intervention, the United States will risk falling into what economists call “strategic irrelevance.”No longer the gravitational center of global production or pricing power, it will retain only military might, cultural exports, and capital flows as instruments of influence. Economic coercion, once the primary lever, will be undermined by the existence of resilient non-dollar trade architecture. In the absence of a new industrial renaissance, the U.S. may lean even more heavily into weapons diplomacy, sanctions regimes, and intelligence proxy-building to reassert control over fragmented spheres. It could shift from rules-maker to rule-breaker, increasingly acting outside international frameworks it once authored.
Given its deep institutional memory of dominance, and its unmatched stockpile of military and technological capacity, the U.S. will not simply cede global positioning quietly. If the economic slide is not reversed, Washington may eventually resort to kinetic forms of pressure: diplomatic destabilization, infrastructure sabotage, or even armed conflict dressed in the language of “freedom of navigation,” “supply chain security,” or “democratic resilience.” This will be sold to domestic audiences as leadership, but the world may read it as panic.
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