The following article, "The Concrete Wall of the Third Rome," presents a critical analysis of the current state of Russia under the ruling regime, drawing parallels to the fall of the Roman Empire. The author argues that Russia, heavily reliant on its resource-based economy, faces significant challenges due to shifting global dynamics, particularly the shale oil revolution, which has drastically reduced oil prices.
The article highlights the regime's focus on maintaining power rather than investing in economic diversification and infrastructure development. It suggests that this neglect, coupled with the concentration of wealth among a select group of "new nobles," may lead to societal unrest and potential collapse.
The author posits that in response to these mounting pressures, the ruling regime may resort to a "Great War" any time between 2021-2023 to redistribute spheres of influence and expand its consumer market. The article concludes by emphasizing the inevitability of this "concrete wall" and the global implications of Russia's potential actions.
[Translated document content]
The Concrete Wall of the Third Rome
#concretewall
April 23, 2017
Let's compare notes.
September 4 is the official day of the end of the Roman Empire under Romulus Augustus. Rome began with Romulus and ended with Romulus. In fact, after 10 months of reign, the noble imperial purple color was replaced by the modest colors of exile, the consuls continued to be elected, the Senate continued to sit, and chariot races continued to be held in the Circus Maximus. However, the center of decision-making shifted for several decades to the Second Rome -- Constantinople, which took on the role amidst the gradual collapse of the empire. If someone had said to the noble Romans that the Roman Empire was already just an interesting part of history and nothing more, they would have been treated as an eccentric person at best. Something similar is happening with the Russian feudal empire.
If we abstract from the murky theories about the center of control in North Korea, although the connection of the current Lubyanka nomenclature with North Korea is obvious, it is nevertheless hardly a single organism. The real contender for the status of the Fourth Rome is China, as predicted by Orwell. In this sense, a large integration process has begun, lasting several hundred years, within the framework of which a large state can emerge on the basis of Russia and China. Logic, however, dictates that this entails some uncomfortable conclusions.
Nevertheless, the Lubyanka regime lives on, briskly annexing neighboring lands, meddling in the Atlantic, sending thugs to the UN, supplying weapons to terrorists, and, it seems, living life to the fullest - no fundamental changes are visible. Granted, it is clear that the sanctions have begun to take effect, the Reserve Fund is melting, and perhaps even the Bank of Russia does not know how much gold and foreign exchange reserves are actually left. But still, it is already midnight, and there is still no inferno fire. The Russian authorities managed to avoid the concrete wall, the appearance of which was so predictable. Or did they fail?
Let's look at the basic conditions first:
Russia occupies 2-3rd place in the world in terms of oil production; 1st in diamonds; 2nd in natural gas; 2nd in aluminum, titanium, platinum; 3rd in gold; 4th in silver; 6th in uranium; 5th in steel; 2nd in rye; 4th in wheat; 6th in timber; 7th in copper; 11th in zinc. It is one of the largest producers of mineral fertilizers.
Thus, Russia is a huge warehouse of resources, which, as I now understand, the Lubyanka analysts do not plan to use in any other way. All the current national programs to support and develop domestic production, innovations, etc., are just whistles through which the steam of the dissatisfied should escape. Various "investment structures" under state formations are also used for this kind of special operations. You can guess which of them are active in this: those who have losses from year to year, but they, at the same time, do not have any problems with the inspection authorities. I understand that for thinking people who now live in Russia, this is an open secret, so I will not dwell on it.
It is also worth mentioning arms exports, which I do not consider to be a pure business for the following reasons: it must be discounted, since Russia often does not receive real money for the weapons sold, exchanging this for vague promises to follow Russia's official policy. These weapons are thus obtained effortlessly and completely free of charge by various extremist groups. To put it bluntly, Russia is the main exporter of terrorism in the world today, and organizations like the Baath Party -- from which the PLO, ISIS and a number of other extremist organizations grew -- are completely subsidized by the Soviet KGB.
At that time, subsidies were made from offshore companies in the British Virgin Islands, and, for example, Yevgeny Primakov was even a direct shareholder there for quite a long time. This structure was then merged with one of the then small Western banks, which unexpectedly showed a huge interest in doing business in Russia, and now this bank occupies a very serious position in Russia. If we take this for granted, then much in the policy of Russia since the late 1990s, and since the 1970s in the USSR, becomes clear. In this sense, the main shareholder of Russia is, figuratively, the Lubyanka, and its holder today is Putin and about 30 other people -- in this sense, they are the same conditional oligarchs as, say, Primakov once was. Some of these hypothetical oligarchs are real managers, and some are only nominal beneficiaries. Who do they represent? The answer is simple -- a new nobility.
It is based on the already existing model of Middle Eastern countries, with which people in the Lubyanka are so familiar. In fact, this is the model of the United Arab Emirates, where there are 8.5 million professionals for 1.5 million Bedouin nobles and a comparable budget of several hundred billion dollars perfectly pulls this model, providing purchasing power parity of $70,000 per capita. I even think that at the very beginning this plan looked quite workable, because in the 2000s, there was an increase in well-being or purchasing power, albeit several times less than in the UAE, in Russia. Of course, it was caused not by the actions of the retired KGB major's team, but to a lesser extent by the remnants of the market reforms launched by Boris Yeltsin and, to a greater extent, by the rise in energy prices.
It would seem that it is quite possible to repeat this model in Russia, where there are indeed about 1.5 million new nobles -- natives of the NKVD-MGB-KGB-FSB and a number of siloviki who have joined them, and about 10 million people who, conditionally, serve the extraction of minerals and their transportation, security and accounting. On a smaller scale, at least because labor productivity in the UAE is 4 times higher than in Russia, but it still looked quite realistic.
As we know from the second law of thermodynamics, the entropy of closed systems cannot decrease. The UAE only looks like a closed system, but, as such, it is not: the country is desperately developing all possible directions of GDP growth in the non-resource field. That is why the country has become a large offshore zone, reluctantly allowing orders that it does not like in the country so that Western specialists can comfortably exist there. So much so that the $70,000 of said purchasing power is already a non-commodity share of almost $40,000. This is not the case in Russia. There are no reliable statistics, but according to my estimates, the share of non-raw materials does not exceed 20%, and even then, taking into account the use of dumping prices for gas, as, for example, in metallurgy. Most likely, we are talking about a few percent.
But here's the thing: lately it has become obvious even to the workers of the Uralvagagozavod that debit and credit no longer coincide. What went wrong? It's simple: a black swan flew in and waved its shale wing. Let me say right away that it was impossible not to sleep through the shale revolution in Russia: even if Rosneft had understood what was happening, it would have been impossible to find any real economic move in this direction, taking into account the previously built nomenclature and command system of the late Andropov model, which was mistakenly hammered into the head of a retired KGB major.
Average break-even prices for U.S. shale oil fell from $80 to $35 per barrel between 2013 and 2016. In four years, the price of oil has dropped by an average of 55%. Of course, it will still have surges, but the technology is already there and the cost continues to decrease.
In principle, this is still not the worst news: the market situation has changed, and it is clear that an understandable solution in this case would be to lighten the ruble, invest in the development of diversification and build a regional center, for example, to enrich raw materials to the next level, and in a number of areas compete with the products of the final cycle. Against the backdrop of the paradigm of maintaining the power of a particular group of people, all this no longer looked like such an easy undertaking, but it was still quite feasible.
Is it possible to see that there is a great potential for growth in the Russian economy, which can be realized in a favorable price environment? It is possible, but if you look at the statistics, it turns out that there are no serious efforts in this direction.
Industrial production in Russia in 2016 was 89% of 1991, and by 1990 it was even less.
Oil production in 1990 was 516 million tons, in 2016 the same amount (2015 -- 502 million tons).
Natural gas in 1990 -- 641 billion cubic meters, in 2016 -- 639 billion cubic meters (2015 -- 633 billion cubic meters).
Coal in 1990 -- 395 million tons, in 2016 -- 385 million tons (in 2015 -- 372 million tons)
Pig iron in 1990 --- 59.4 million tons, in 2016 -- 51.9 million tons (in 2015 -- 53.7 million tons)
Steel in 1990 -- 89.6 million tons, in 2016 -- 69.6 million tons (in 2015 -- 69.4 million tons)
Cement in 1990 -- 83.0 million tons, in 2016 -- 55.0 million tons (in 2015 -- 62.1 million tons)
Steel pipes in 1990 -- 11.9 million tons, in 2016 -- 10.1 million tons (in 2015 -- 11.4 million tons)
Suppose, however, that prices are fixed at this level, but the caravan continues to move. However, the muleteer did not take into account that it is only necessary to look, for example, at the state of the infrastructure in Russia, and now black swans can become the Russian national bird:
"Share of roads that do not meet regulatory requirements of regional or inter-municipal significance" in Russia: 61.9%, in the Vologda Region -- 96.9%, in Kalmykia -- 93.7%, in the Saratov Region -- 91%, in the Arkhangelsk Region -- 87.7%, in the Kostroma Region -- 84.5%, in the Ryazan Region -- 84%, in the Orenburg Region -- 79%, in the Novgorod and Tver Regions -- 75% (Rosstat, 2015). Truckers, who are now being extorted by the retired major's friends, are paying for these non-compliant roads. How much longer will they endure? It seems that not at all.
"Share of the street water supply network in need of replacement in the total length of the street water supply network" (Rosstat, 2015):
Russian Federation -- 44.4%, Moscow -- 58.6%, Tomsk -- 95.4%, Saratov -- 81.9%, Barnaul -- 81.2%, Kostroma, Magadan -- 79.2%, Ufa, Khabarovsk -- 78.8%, Maykop -- 78.1%, Vladimir -- 75.8%, Kurgan -- 75.1%, Nizhny Novgorod -- 74.7%, Omsk -- 74.6%, Murmansk -- 71.3%, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky -- 70.9%.
"Share of wastewater not treated to standard values in the total volume of wastewater passed through treatment facilities" (Rosstat, 2015): Russia -- 54.3%, St. Petersburg, Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, Cherkessk -- 100%, Lipetsk, Ryazan -- 99.8%, Penza -- 99.7%, Samara -- 99.6%, Omsk -- 99.4%, Krasnodar -- 98.3%, Tula -- 98.0%, Kursk -- 96.9%, Arkhangelsk -- 95.6%, Perm -- 91.7%. This translates into epidemics, diseases, and infestations.
"Share of the street sewerage network in need of replacement in the total length of the street water supply network":
Russia -- 43.6%, Moscow -- 69.8%, Birobidzhan -- 94.3%, Kurgan -- 93.2%, Kyzyl -- 85.3%, Maykop -- 83.2%, Elista -- 79.5%, Vladikavkaz -- 78.2%, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky -- 78.4%, Murmansk -- 78.0%, Kostroma -- 77.9%, Ivanovo -- 77.1%, Arkhangelsk -- 76.5%, Tomsk -- 75.8%, Vladivostok -- 73.8%, Nizhny Novgorod -- 73.6%, Perm -- 73.3%,
"Share of uncaptured and neutralized air pollutants in the total amount of emissions from stationary sources" (Rosstat, 2012): Not caught and not neutralized! Russian Federation -- 25.7%, Moscow -- 60.4%, Tyumen Region -- 98.5%, Udmurtia -- 94.1%, Astrakhan Region -- 91.3%, Kamchatka Territory -- 90.3%, Dagestan -- 82.2%, Chuvash Region -- 76.5%, Kaliningrad Region -- 72.4%, Tver Region -- 72.1%, Vladimir Region -- 70.7%, Oryol Region -- 67.8%, Yaroslavl Region -- 62.9%, Voronezh Region -- 61.8%, Nizhny Novgorod Region -- 58.2%. Indirect statistics of cancer in Russia (in terms of the volume of drugs ordered) are simply monstrous.
"The share of state and municipal healthcare institutions whose buildings are in disrepair or in need of major repairs" is 48.1% in Russia, 91.9% in the Trans-Baikal Territory, 84.9% in Sakhalin, 80.6% in the Kurgan Region, 80.3% in Chuvashia, 80.2% in the Kirov and Perm Territories, and 78.6% in the Penza Region. Moscow -- 36.6%. 93 million square meters of housing are in need of major repairs. 3 times more than in 1990. What has the retired major been doing with the athletes all this time? He solved global issues of the greatness of foreign policy.
However, let's face it: an overvalued ruble, pumped up by the carry trade, expensive and heavy credit, tight monetary policy, a hunger for investment, diligently maintained at the highest level, incomparably large taxes for the economy, the concentration of property in the hands of one set of owners, it is difficult to call them a state, volatility, incentives for the development of the gray economy - all this will definitely and reliably remove the economy from the raw material needle. The absence of reasonable movements in the direction of leveling the economy can no longer be anything but conscious tactics. What for?
What is the deeper meaning of driving oneself into the economy of "beads versus raw materials"? Strategy was not taught at the Lubyanka, the main efforts there were always devoted to tactics. If the main paradigm is to hold on to power, and there is not enough money left to appease 135,000,000 people and the new nobles are already in short supply, then, as can be seen from the development of events in social security, education and health care, the decision has been made, I emphasize: it has already been made, the decision to reduce the number of people in the most cynical way. Therefore, the resources of pension savings of two generations were spent to maintain the ruble exchange rate, which was harmful to producers. Instead of developing people's talents and capabilities, they will not only not be allowed to grow, but, as crazy as it may seem, they will try by all means to shorten their lives and opportunities.
As you can see, the current government no longer repeats the mistakes of 1917 - in 1916, Tsar Nicholas II sent guardsmen to the front, which pretty much battered the guards and no one began to protect him in St. Petersburg, but now the guards are fed, and in the two Russian capitals GDP, as in Spain and the Czech Republic, respectively. There will be no rebellion from there. However, in the regions, people will soon lose patience with multi-layered disasters and the lack of any real interest in their lives on the part of the state. And this is clearly seen from the statistics. At some point, the effect of the 90s will seem like flowers against the background of current events.
In the past, a "small victorious war" helped in such cases. But the last two wars were, to put it mildly, not victorious. And one day, in many parts of Russia, the common man will ask himself, when he learns that the Kremlin is attacking Antarctica: "Why do I need all this?"And as an answer to this question, the Kremlin will need to ask at least one of its guards, the Cardinal, to sacrifice himself. And, as far as I know the breed of guardsmen, they will ask themselves: "What's the point?!" And all this is already happening against the backdrop of ever-increasing entropy. Obviously, this is also clear to the Kremlin ruler, if not at the level of analysis, but at the level of the instinct of a cowardly thug who weighs the chances of being rebuffed.
In practical terms, this means that shortly before the inevitable occurrence of this event, which, I repeat, is dictated by purely economic factors, within the horizon from 2021 to 2023, the thug will be forced, in order to preserve his power and, thus, in his particular case, his life, to start a Great War for the redistribution of spheres of influence. For the positive preservation of the empire, according to Soviet-era calculations, by 2050 it needs to have a consumer market of 320 to 500 million people. In Russia, they have long given up on hopes of producing something that may be in demand in the world. There is only one way left - a military seizure of power in Europe along the borders of the Warsaw Pact. Of course, I am aware that in the context of the present tense I do not look like a completely [mentally] healthy person, but I ask you not to kill the messenger - I am conveying someone else's hopes, not my own thoughts.
This is a concrete wall, dear citizens of the world. And you can already see it. Things like that. In the past, however, I thought that this wall was only about Russia. And this is our wall. There's probably no need to explain why.